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Abstract
Recently, one of the authors introduced a simple and yet powerful non-monotonic knowledge
representation framework, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB. Theories in AEB are
called autoepistemic belief theories. Every belief theory T has been shown to have the least static
expansion T which is computed by iterating a natural monotonic belief closure operator ΨT starting
from T . This way, the least static expansion T of any belief theory provides its natural non-monotonic
semantics which is called the static semantics.
It is easy to see that if a belief theory T is finite then the construction of its least static expansion T
stops after countably many iterations. However, a somewhat surprising result obtained in this paper
shows that the least static expansion of any finite belief theory T is in fact obtained by means of a
single iteration of the belief closure operator ΨT (although this requires T to be of a special form,
we also show that T can be always put in this form). This result eliminates the need for multiple
iterations in the computation of static semantics and allows us to replace the fixed-point definition of
static semantics by the equivalent explicit and straightforward definition given by T = ΨT (T ).
The second, closely related result establishes an intriguing relationship between static semantics
T and Clark’s completions comp(T ) of finite belief theories. Here we use a slightly generalized
version of comp(T ) (see Definition 3.2). It shows that the static semantics T of T is obtained by
augmenting T with the set Bcomp(T ) = {BF : F ∈ comp(T )} thus ensuring that all formulae that
belong to Clark’s completion comp(T ) of T are believed to be true.
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tional Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-96), Cambridge, MA, 1996,
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Both results open the way for a more efficient implementation of static semantics: the first, because
only one iteration is needed, and the second because reasoning in a non-standard logic (belief theories
under static semantics) can be reduced to classical theorem proving involving Clark’s completion.
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1. Introduction
The problem of finding inference mechanisms, capable to model human common-
sense reasoning and to reason in the absence of complete information, is one of the
major research and implementation problems in AI. Accordingly, over the last 20–30
years a large number of formalizations of commonsense (or non-monotonic) reasoning,
and their inference engines, have been proposed. Among these, the most prominent and
most actively studied turned out to be Reiter’s CWA [26], McCarthy’s circumscription
[18], Moore’s autoepistemic logic [20], Reiter’s default logic [25] and Kowalski’s logic
programming [17].
While logic programming is often just viewed as a formal specification for declarative
programming languages, such as PROLOG, in the authors’ view and in the view of
many researchers actively studying this area, logic programming plays a much more
important role as a non-monotonic knowledge representation language. Its importance
stems from several factors. First of all, logic programming is a relatively simple non-
monotonic formalism (compared to other major formalisms): it allows only atomic heads
of clauses and implements only one non-monotonic feature, namely, default negation (or
negation as failure) and it is restricted to atomic formulae. On the other hand, as shown
by the extensive research conducted during the last decade or two, logic programming is
sufficiently expressive to allow formalization of many important problems in commonsense
reasoning. As a result, logic programming offers fertile testing grounds for studying,
relating and comparing of various formalizations of commonsense reasoning in a relatively
simple and yet quite expressive framework.
The results of such extensive studies have been quite impressive. A number of different
semantics for logic programming have been proposed and studied in detail. Two of them
turned out to be most promising: the stable semantics [15] and the well founded semantics
[31]. The relationship of the stable semantics to other major non-monotonic formalisms
has been well established. It turns out that, under a suitable embedding, static semantics
can be simply viewed as a special case of Moore’s autoepistemic logic AEL [20].
Recently, these semantics have also been used in various areas of traditional AI, like
planning [9], agent reasoning [10,13,14,28,29] or in verification (see references in [30]).
In particular it has been shown that systems based on these semantics (like smodels [21]
or XSB [24]) can successfully compete with dedicated systems (the recent workshop on
Logic based AI organized by Jack Minker, June 1999, gave impressive evidence for this).
Consequently, a further analysis of how these semantics can be extended, unified and
computed in a feasible way will most probably lead to new applications or better algorithms
in the above mentioned or similar areas of AI. Our approach can be viewed as extending
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traditional semantics to semantics dealing with beliefs. Beliefs play an important role
whenever available information is incomplete and can be described using statements
expressing beliefs.
Our investigations show that the fixpoint of a certain sequence defining the static
semantics (which itself contains most of the traditional non-monotonic semantics) is:
(1) reached after finitely many steps, and
(2) it is closely related to a version of Clark’s completion for finite belief theories.
Thus our results may also have an impact on those semantics.
We now explain our results in more detail. In [22,23], one of the authors introduced
a simple and yet powerful non-monotonic knowledge representation framework which
isomorphically contains all of the above mentioned non-monotonic formalisms and
semantics as special cases and yet is significantly more expressive than each one of these
formalisms considered individually. The new logic, called the Autoepistemic Logic of
Beliefs, AEB, has been shown to constitute a powerful new formalism which can serve as
a unifying framework for several major non-monotonic formalisms. It allows us to better
understand mutual relationships existing between different formalisms and semantics and
enables us to provide them with simpler and more natural definitions. It also naturally leads
to new, even more expressive, flexible and modular formalizations and semantics [23].
Theories in the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs are called autoepistemic belief theories.
As it is the case in Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, semantics of belief theories is defined
by means of introducing a class of their so called static expansions. Static expansions are
fixed points of a natural monotonic belief closure operator ΨT . However, as opposed to
autoepistemic logic and its stable expansions, every belief theory T has the least static
expansion T which can be computed by iterating the belief operator ΨT . This way, the
least static expansion of any belief theory provides its natural non-monotonic semantics
which is called the static semantics, namely the set of all formulae contained in the least
static expansion T .
It is easy to see that if a belief theory T is finite then the construction of its least
static expansion T will stop after countably many iterations. However, a powerful and
somewhat surprising result obtained in this paper shows that the least static expansion of
any finite belief theory T is in fact obtained by means of a single iteration of the belief
closure operator ΨT . 2 We will later show that T can be always put in this form. This
result eliminates the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static semantics and
allows us to replace the fixed-point definition of static semantics by the equivalent explicit
and straightforward definition given by T = ΨT (T ). Needless to say, the existence of an
equivalent non-fixed-point definition of static semantics significantly simplifies this notion
and the underlying theory. It also provides the foundation for the interesting results and
applications obtained in [5].
The second, closely related result establishes a very interesting and somewhat intriguing
relationship between static semantics T and Clark’s completions comp(T ) of finite belief
theories. Note that we use here a slightly generalized version of Clark’s completion
introduced in [1,4] (see Definition 3.2). Namely we first transform the theory T in a
special normal form, called the residual theory. This transformed theory has exactly the
2 To be precise, this requires T to be in a special normal form, called a residual program.
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same models as T . Then we use the syntactic form of T to apply the original Clark’s
completion. Details will be given below.
It shows that the static semantics T of T is obtained by augmenting T with the set
Bcomp(T ) = {BF : F ∈ comp(T )} thus ensuring that all formulae that belong to Clark’s
completion comp(T ) of T are believed to be true. It reduces reasoning under the static
semantics T to the easily accomplished computation of Clark’s completion comp(T )
together with theorem proving in the underlying modal logic AEB, which can be done
either by hand or using an automated theorem prover.
Both results open the way for a more efficient implementation of static semantics: the
first, because only one iteration is needed, and the second because reasoning in a non-
standard logic (belief theories under static semantics) can be reduced to classical theorem
proving involving Clark’s completion.
2. Autoepistemic belief theories
We begin by recalling the definition and basic properties of autoepistemic belief theories,
AEB, originally introduced in [22,23]. Consider a fixed propositional language L with
standard connectives (∨, ∧, ¬, →,←, ↔) and the propositional letters true and false. We
denote the set of its propositions by 〈AtL〉. Extend the languageL to a propositional modal
language LAEB by augmenting it with a modal operator B, called the belief operator. The
formulae of the form BF , where F is an arbitrary formula of LAEB, are called belief atoms
and are considered to be atomic formulae in the extended propositional modal language
LAEB. The formulae of the original language L are called objective. Any propositional
theory in the modal language LAEB will be called an autoepistemic belief theory (or just a
“belief theory” for short).
Definition 2.1 (Autoepistemic belief theories—Przymusinski [23]). By a belief theory we
mean an arbitrary theory in the propositional language LAEB, i.e., a (possibly infinite) set
of clauses of the form:
B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧BG1 ∧ · · · ∧BGk→A1 ∨ · · · ∨Al ∨BF1 ∨ · · · ∨ BFn,
where m,n, k, l > 0, Ai ’s and Bi ’s are objective atoms and Fi ’s and Gi ’s are arbitrary
formulae of LAEB.
We assume the following two simple axiom schemata and one inference rule describing
the arguably obvious properties of belief atoms:
(CA) Consistency Axiom. B(true) and ¬B(false).
(DA) Distributive Axiom. B(F ∧G)↔ BF ∧BG.
(IR) Invariance Inference Rule. F ↔GBF ↔ BG.
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Remark 2.1. Although the set of axioms used in the above definition is slightly different
from the one used in the original definition of autoepistemic belief theories given in [23],
the two axiom systems are completely equivalent (see Appendix A.4).
As usual, a mapping I :AtL ∪ {BF : F ∈ LAEB}→ {true, false} denotes a propositional
interpretation of LAEB, i.e., we simply treat the formulae BF as new propositions.
Therefore, the notion of a model carries over from propositional logic. A formulaF ∈LAEB
is a propositional consequence of T ⊆ LAEB iff for every interpretation I :I |= T ⇒ I |=
F . In the examples, we will represent models by sets of literals showing the truth values of
only those objective and belief atoms which are relevant to our considerations.
Definition 2.2 (Derivable formulae (Przymusinski [23])). For any belief theory T we
denote by CnAEB(T ) the smallest set of formulae of the language LAEB which contains T ,
all (substitution instances of) the axioms CA and DA and is closed under both propositional
consequence and the invariance rule IR.
We say that a formula F is derivable from the belief theory T if F belongs to CnAEB(T ).
We denote this fact by T `AEB F . A belief theory T is consistent if CnAEB(T ) is consistent,
i.e., if CnAEB(T ) 6`AEB false.
From the results established in [23] it immediately follows that the following lemma,
which will be needed in the sequel, holds.
Proposition 2.3. For any belief theory T and formulae F,G ∈ LAEB:
T `AEB (BF →¬B¬F),
T `AEB (B(F →G)∧BF)→ BG.
If T `AEB F then T `AEB BF.
The first statement says that if a formula F is believed to be true then its negation ¬F is
not. The second statement says that if the formulae F →G and F are believed then so is
G. The last inference rule says that if a formula F is derivable then it is also believed.
2.1. Semantics of autoepistemic belief theories
We now need to define a non-monotonic semantics for autoepistemic belief theories.
Intuitively, we need to provide a meaning to the belief atoms BF . We want the intended
meaning of belief atoms BF to be based on the principle of predicate minimization (see
[16,18,19]):BF holds if F is minimally entailed, or, equivalently: BF holds if F is true in
all minimal models. In order to make this intended meaning precise we first have to define
what we mean by a minimal model of a belief theory.
Definition 2.4 (Minimal models—Przymusinski [23]). A modelM is smaller than a model
N if it contains the same belief atoms but has fewer objective atoms, i.e.,
{p ∈AtL: M |= p} ⊂ {p ∈AtL: N |= p},
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{F ∈LAEB: M |= BF } = {F ∈ LAEB: N |= BF }.
By a minimal model of a belief theory T we mean a model M of T with the property that
there is no smaller model N of T . If a formula F is true in all minimal models of T then
we write T |=min F and say that F is minimally entailed by T .
Example 2.5. Consider the following simple belief theory T :
→ Car.
Car ∧B¬Broken→ Runs.
Let us prove that T minimally entails ¬Broken, i.e., T |=min ¬Broken. Indeed, in order
to find minimal models of T we need to assign an arbitrary truth value to the only belief
atom B¬Broken, and then minimize the objective atoms Broken, Car and Runs. We easily
see that T has the following two minimal models (truth values of the remaining belief
atoms are irrelevant and are therefore omitted): M1 = {B¬Broken, Car, Runs, ¬Broken}
and M2 = {¬B¬Broken, Car, ¬Runs, ¬Broken}. Since in both of them Car is true, and
Broken is false, we deduce that T |=min Car and T |=min ¬Broken.
As in Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic, the intended meaning of belief atoms in autoepis-
temic belief theories is enforced by defining suitable expansions of such theories.
Definition 2.6 (Static expansions of belief theories—Przymusinski [22,23]). A belief
theory T  is called a static expansion of a belief theory T if it satisfies the following
fixed-point equation
T  = CnAEB
(
T ∪ {BF : T  |=min F}),
where F ranges over all formulae of LAEB.
Thus a static expansion T  of T is obtained by augmenting T with all belief atoms BF
with the property that F is minimally entailed by the fixed point T .
Theorem 2.7 (Least static expansion (Przymusinski [22,23])). Every belief theory T has
the least static expansion, namely, the least fixed point T of the operatorΨT (X)CnAEB(T ∪
{BF : X |=min F }). Moreover this belief closure operator ΨT is monotonic.
More precisely, the least static expansion T of T can be constructed as follows. Let
T 0 = T and suppose that T α has already been defined for any ordinal number α < β . If
β = α+ 1 is a successor ordinal then define:
T α+1 = ΨT
(
T α
) def= CnAEB(T ∪ {BF : T α |=min F}),
where F ranges over all formulae in LAEB. Else, if β is a limit ordinal then define
T β =⋃α<β T α . The sequence {T α} is monotonically increasing and has a unique fixed
point T = T λ = ΨT (T λ), for some ordinal λ.
The above result allows us to establish the following useful characterization of the least
static completion of a belief theory.
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Theorem 2.8 (Characterization of least static expansions). The least static expansion of a
belief theory T coincides with the smallest theory T̂ satisfying the conditions:
(1) T ⊆ T̂ ;
(2) T̂ = CnAEB(T̂ );
(3) if T̂ |=min F then BF ∈ T̂ .
Proof. Clearly the least static expansion T of T satisfies the above conditions (1)–(3) so
T̂ ⊆ T . Moreover, from the conditions (1)–(3) and the very definition of ΨT it follows
immediately that ΨT (T̂ ) ⊆ T̂ . Since the operator ΨT is monotonic on such theories (see
[23]), we conclude that T 1 = ΨT (T )⊆ ΨT (T̂ )⊆ T̂ , and, more generally, T α ⊆ T̂ , for any
ordinal α. We conclude therefore that T ⊆ T̂ . 2
Observe that the least static expansion T of T contains those and only those formulae
which are true in all static expansions of T . It constitutes the so called static completion of
a belief theory T .
Example 2.9. Consider a slightly more complex belief theory T :
B¬Broken→ Runs.
B¬Fixed→ Broken.
In order to iteratively compute its static completion T we let T 0 = T . As in Example 2.5,
one easily checks that T 0 |=min ¬Fixed. Since
T 1 = ΨT
(
T 0
)= CnAEB(T ∪ {BF : T 0 |=min F}),
it follows that B¬Fixed ∈ T 1 and therefore Broken ∈ T 1. Since,
T 2 = ΨT
(
T 1
)= CnAEB(T ∪ {BF : T 1 |=min F}),
it follows that BBroken ∈ T 2. From Proposition 2.3 we conclude that ¬B¬Broken ∈ T 2
and therefore T 2 |=min ¬Runs. Accordingly, since:
T 3 = ΨT
(
T 2
)= CnAEB(T ∪ {BF : T 2 |=min F}),
we infer that B¬Runs∈ T 3. As expected, the static completion T of T , which contains T 3,
asserts that the car is considered not to be fixed and therefore broken and thus is not in a
running condition.
Definition 2.10 (Static completion and static semantics). The least static expansion T of
a belief theory T is called the static completion of T . It describes the static semantics of a
belief theory T .
Consequently, like the predicate completion semantics of a logic program P is
completely determined by its Clark’s completion comp(P ), the static semantics of a belief
theory T is fully determined by its static completion T . It is easy to verify that a belief
theory T either has a consistent static completion T or it does not have any consistent
static expansions at all.
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3. Static completions versus Clark’s completions
It is easy to see that if a belief theory is finite then the construction of its static completion
(or the least static expansion) will stop after countably many steps. However, the surprising
result obtained in this article shows that static completions of finite belief theories T are
in fact obtained by means of a single iteration of the belief closure operator ΨT . This
result eliminates the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static completions
and allows us to replace the fixed-point definition of static completions by the equivalent
explicit definition given by T = ΨT (T ).
The second, closely related result establishes a very interesting and somewhat intriguing
relationship between static completions T and Clark’s completions comp(T ) of finite
belief theories. It shows that the static completion T of a belief theory T coincides with
CnAEB(T ∪ {BF : F ∈ comp(T )}), i.e., with the set of formulae derivable from the belief
theory T augmented with the set
Bcomp(T )= {BF : F ∈ comp(T )}.
The latter set represents the set of beliefs in formulae that belong to Clark’s completion.
Even though, strictly speaking, the last result only applies to the so called residual theories
(see below), we do not lose generality, as we will show that every finite belief theory can be
transformed into a finite residual belief theory with an equivalent set of minimal models.
Since Clark’s completion comp(T ) is easily computable, this result reduces reasoning
under the static semantics to theorem proving in the underlying modal logic AEB (this
can be done either by hand or by using an automated theorem prover).
The proof of these two powerful results is based on the idea of adding to a belief theory
T the set of formulae which ensure that models “seen” through the belief operator B
are in fact minimal. As we will soon see, this task can be accomplished by a suitable
generalization of Clark’s completion but it only works for a restricted class of belief
theories, namely those whose clauses do not have any objective premises. Such residual
theories were previously introduced and investigated in the class of logic programs [1,4,6,
7,11,12]. Here we give a slightly more general definition.
Definition 3.1 (Residual belief theories—Brass and Dix [1]). Arbitrary belief theory
whose clauses do not contain any objective (positive) premises, i.e., a (possibly infinite)
set of arbitrary clauses
BG1 ∧ · · · ∧ BGk→A1 ∨ · · · ∨Al ∨ BF1 ∨ · · · ∨BFn,
where n, k, l > 0, Ai ’s are objective atoms and Fi ’s and Gi ’s are arbitrary formulae of
LAEB.
Whenever convenient, clauses
BG1 ∧ · · · ∧ BGk→ BF1 ∨ · · · ∨ BFn,
i.e., clauses without any objective atoms in their heads, will be considered as clauses with
a single objective atom false in their head, i.e., clauses of the form:
BG1 ∧ · · · ∧ BGk→ false∨ BF1 ∨ · · · ∨BFn.
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Now we describe a natural extension of the notion of Clark’s completion comp(T ).
Clark’s completion was initially introduced in [8] for the class of normal logic programs.
Subsequently, its generalizations to disjunctive programs without positive premises were
studied in [1]. Here we extend it to the class of all residual belief theories. As usual, the
goal is to ensure that an objective atom A is true only if it really has to be true, i.e., if there
is a rule with A in the head, in which the body is true and all the other head literals are
false.
Definition 3.2 (Extended Clark’s completion). Given a finite residual belief theory T and
an objective atom A from L (including the falsity atom false) we define the extended
Clark’s completion comp(A,T ) of the atom A in T to be the formula:
A↔
∨
16m6s
(BG1,m ∧· · · ∧BGkm,m ∧¬A1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Alm,m
∧¬BF1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BFnm,m),
where
BG1,m ∧ · · · ∧BGkm,m→A∨A1,m ∨ · · · ∨Alm,m ∨ BF1,m ∨ · · · ∨BFnm,m,
for 16m6 s, are all clauses in T containing the atom A in their heads.
By the extended Clark’s completion comp(T ) of a belief theory T we mean the union
of all completions comp(A,T ) of A in T , for all objective atoms A in the language L
(including the falsity atom false).
The following interesting result shows that if T is a residual belief theory, then the
models of Clark’s completion comp(T ) are precisely the minimal models of T itself. In
other words, Clark’s completion precisely describes the minimal model semantics of a
residual belief theory T .
Proposition 3.3. Let T be a finite residual belief theory. An interpretation M of the
language LAEB is a minimal model of T if and only if M is a model of Clark’s completion
comp(T ) of T .
Proof. Contained in Appendix A.1. 2
It is worth pointing out that one of the weaknesses of the original version of Clark’s
completion proposed in [8] was the fact that it was applied not just to residual but rather
to arbitrary normal programs. As a result, Clark’s original completion did not enforce
minimal model semantics, e.g., a tautology like p← p made the completion axiom for
p useless. Another problem with the original definition of Clark’s completion was that
it did not distinguish between logical negation ¬p and belief B¬p. As a result, Clark’s
completion could be inconsistent when rules like p← B¬p were present.
Although the above result, as well as the definition of Clark’s completion, applies only
to the class of residual belief theories, it turns out that every finite belief theory T can be
transformed into a finite residual belief theory Tres so that their sets of minimal models
coincide.
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Proposition 3.4. Every finite belief theory T can be transformed into a finite residual
belief theory Tres, called the residuum of T , so that an interpretation M of the language
LAEB is a minimal model of T if and only if M is a minimal model of Tres.
Proof. Contained in Appendix A.2. 2
In fact, just two elementary theory transformations, namely, “unfolding” (or partial
evaluation, GPPE [4,27]) and “elimination of tautologies”, are sufficient to obtain such
a residual program. For a detailed definition of these transformations the reader is referred
to [1–4]. Here we describe them very briefly.
The “elimination of tautologies” allows us to remove a rule if it contains the same atom
in both, head and body. Such rules are always trivially satisfied and therefore useless. The
transformation of “unfolding”—also called GPPE—is defined as follows. Suppose that B
is an objective atom and let B ∨ Ai ←Ri , i = 1, . . . , n, be all rules about B , i.e., rules
containing B in their head. The application of GPPE to the ruleA← B ∧R, that contains
B in its body, results in a new belief theory obtained by deleting the rule A← B ∧R and
adding to the belief theory the new rules A∨Ai←R∧Ri .
We now give a simple example. Whenever convenient, we use the traditional inverse
notation for clauses. Consider the following belief theory T . The first two clauses already
have the required form. In the last clause, we unfold the body literal q and obtain the
residual program Tres.
T : p ∨ q ← B¬r.
q ← B¬q.
r ← q.
Tres: p ∨ q ← B¬r.
q ← B¬q.
p ∨ r ← B¬r.
r ← B¬q.
One can easily see that this procedure represents a form of hyper-resolution.
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 we obtain the following
important theorem which says that for any finite belief theory T , Clark’s completion of
its residuum Tres precisely describes the minimal model semantics of T .
Theorem 3.5. Let T be any finite belief theory. An interpretationM of the languageLAEB
is a minimal model of T if and only if M is a model of Clark’s completion comp(Tres) of
the residuum Tres of T .
Finally, let us denote by Bcomp(Tres) the set {BF : F ∈ comp(Tres)}. Intuitively, aug-
menting a given belief theory S with Bcomp(Tres) ensures that all formulae that belong to
Clark’s completion comp(Tres) are believed. We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let T be an arbitrary finite belief theory and let
T̂ = CnAEB
(
T ∪Bcomp(Tres)
)
.
If a formula F is true in all minimal models of T̂ then BF is already contained in T̂ . In
other words, ΨT (T̂ )⊆ T̂ .
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Proof. Contained in Appendix A.3. 2
Now we are ready to state the first of the two fundamental results obtained in this article.
Theorem 3.7 (Static completion versus Clark’s completion). The static completion T of
a finite belief theory T can be equivalently defined as:
T = CnAEB
(
T ∪Bcomp(Tres)
)
.
Proof. Let T̂ = CnAEB(T ∪ Bcomp(Tres)). We first show that T̂ = ΨT (T ), i.e.,
T̂ = CnAEB
(
T ∪ {BF : T |=min F }
)
.
(⊆) Let BG ∈ Bcomp(Tres), i.e.,G ∈ comp(Tres). By Theorem 3.5, T |=min G, and thus
B(G) is contained in the right hand side.
(⊇) Let T |=min F . By Theorem 3.5, comp(Tres) |= F . Then there are G1, . . . ,Gn ∈
comp(Tres) such that
G1→ (G2→ (. . . (Gn→ F) . . .))
is a propositional tautology. Thus B(G1 → (G2 → (. . . (Gn → F) . . .))) is
contained in T̂ (see Proposition 2.3). Since B(Gi) ∈ T̂ by construction, we get
BF ∈ T̂ (again by Proposition 2.3).
From Lemma 3.6 it follows that ΨT (T̂ )⊆ T̂ . Since T̂ = ΨT (T ) we conclude that:
ΨT
(
ΨT (T )
)⊆ ΨT (T )
which means that ΨT (ΨT (T )) = ΨT (T ) (because ΨT is monotonically increasing by
Theorem 2.7) and therefore ΨT (T̂ ) = T̂ . This proves that T̂ is a fixed point of the belief
closure operatorΨT and thus is a static expansion of T . Since T̂ = ΨT (T ) we conclude that
T̂ is the least such fixed point and thus coincides with the static completion T of T . 2
The above result states that the static completion T of T is obtained by augmenting
T with the set Bcomp(Tres) thus ensuring that all formulae that belong to Clark’s
completion comp(Tres) of Tres are believed. It establishes an interesting and somewhat
intriguing relationship between static completions and Clark’s completions of finite belief
theories. It also reduces reasoning under the static semantics (i.e., the computation of static
completions T ) to the easily accomplished computation of Clark’s completion comp(Tres)
together with theorem proving in the underlying modal logic.
As a consequence of the proof of the above result we immediately obtain the second
of the two fundamental theorems obtained in this paper, namely a result stating that static
completion T of an arbitrary finite belief theory T is always obtained by a single iteration
of the belief closure operator ΨT (T ).
Theorem 3.8 (Explicit characterization of static completions). The static completion T of
finite belief theory T is always obtained by a single iteration of the belief closure operator
ΨT (T ): T = ΨT (T ). In other words,
T = CnAEB
(
T ∪ {BF : T |=min F }
)
.
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Proof. We have to compare the definition of the operator ΨT with the statement in
Theorem 3.7. In particular we have to compare the set {BF : T |=min F } with the set
Bcomp(Tres). By Proposition 3.3 they are identical. 2
The above theorem states that the static completion T of T is obtained by augmenting
T with beliefs BF in all formulae F which are true in all minimal models of the theory
T itself. It eliminates therefore the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static
completions and allows us to replace the fixed-point definition of static completions by the
equivalent explicit definition. In addition to Theorems 2.7, 2.8 and 3.7, this is the fourth
characterization of static completions presented in this paper. Needless to say, the existence
of an equivalent non-fixed-point definition of static completions significantly simplifies this
notion and the underlying theory. It also provides the foundation for the results obtained
in [5].
Example 3.9. Consider the belief theory T from Example 2.9. We already noted that
T |=min ¬Fixed and thus
B¬Fixed ∈ T = CnAEB
(
T ∪ {BF : T |=min F }
)
.
This implies that T contains also Broken. By Proposition 2.3, BBroken belongs to the
static completion and so does ¬B¬Broken. From the same proposition it follows that
B¬B¬Broken belongs to the completion.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that T |=min B¬Broken↔ Runs (in fact, the formula
B¬Broken↔ Runs belongs to Clark’s completion of T ) and therefore
T |=min ¬B¬Broken↔¬Runs.
It follows that T contains B(¬B¬Broken↔¬Runs), which can also be written in the form
B((¬B¬Broken→¬Runs)∧ (¬B¬Broken←¬Runs)),
and thus the distributive axiom DA can be applied:
B(¬B¬Broken→¬Runs)∧B(¬B¬Broken←¬Runs).
Now we can apply the second formula of Proposition 2.3 to the first conjunct (we already
know that B¬B¬Broken belongs to the completion). Therefore T also contains B¬Runs.
We again conclude that the static semantics of T derivesB¬Fixed, Broken and B¬Runs.
Observe that while the above reasoning utilizes only one iteration of the belief closure
operator, it is slightly more complex than the one used in Example 2.9 where several
iterations were performed. Needless to say, both methods lead to identical results.
Appendix A. Proofs of theorems from Section 3
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.3
(⇒) Suppose I is not a model of comp(T ), so there is a completion axiom comp(A,T )
of an atom A in T :
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A↔
∨
16m6s
(BG1,m ∧· · · ∧BGkm,m ∧¬A1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Alm,m
∧¬BF1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BFnm,m),
which is not satisfied in I . If the direction← is not satisfied then I obviously is not even
a model of T . So assume that this direction is satisfied for all completion axioms, i.e., I is
a model of T . If the direction→ is not satisfied then I |=A (consequently,A 6= false) but
for every rule
BG1,m ∧ · · · ∧BGkm,m→A∨A1,m ∨ · · · ∨Alm,m ∨ BF1,m ∨ · · · ∨BFnm,m,
with A in the head, one of the Ai,j is true or one of the BFi,j is true or one of the BGi,j is
false. But then the interpretation I ′, which differs from I only in I ′ 6|= A, is also a model
of T and therefore I is not minimal.
(⇐) Suppose conversely that I is not a minimal model of T . If I is not even a model,
i.e., does not satisfy some rule
BG1,m ∧ · · · ∧BGkm,m→A∨A1,m ∨ · · · ∨Alm,m ∨ BF1,m ∨ · · · ∨BFnm,m,
then obviously the direction ← of the completion axioms for every Ai is also violated.
So let us assume that I is a model, but not minimal, so there is a smaller model I ′. We
can choose I ′ in such a way that it is minimal. Let A be an objective atom with I |= A
and I ′ 6|= A (consequently, A 6= false). Let us consider the completion axiom comp(A,T )
for A:
A↔
∨
16m6s
(BG1,m ∧· · · ∧BGkm,m ∧¬A1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Alm,m
∧¬BF1,m ∧ · · · ∧ ¬BFnm,m),
By the contraposition of the already proven opposite direction, the minimal model I ′ is a
model of comp(T ), so it satisfies the completion axiom. Since I ′ 6|= A, for every i there
is a j such that I ′ |= Ai,j or I ′ |= BFi,j or I ′ 6|= BGi,j . But since I ′ is smaller than I ,
I ′ |=Ai,j ⇒ I |=Ai,j and I ′ |= BFi,j ⇔ I |= BFi,j and I ′ 6|= BGi,j ⇔ I 6|= BGi,j . Thus,
the right hand side is also false in I , but A is true in I , and therefore we conclude that
I 6|= comp(T ).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3.4
We will show that every belief theory T can be transformed into a residual belief
theory Tres by applying just two transformations, namely, “elimination of tautologies” and
“unfolding”.
It is easy to see that each application of GPPE, perhaps combined with tautology
elimination, removes a given objective atom B from the body of one clause without
introducing any new clauses containing B in their bodies. This means that a finite number
of such transformations will lead to a belief theory that does not contain B’s in bodies of its
clauses. Applying this procedure to all objective atoms appearing in a (finite) belief theory
will therefore produce a residual belief theory.
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Accordingly it suffices to establish the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let T1 and T2 be two belief theories such that T2 results from T1 by an
application of GPPE or deletion of tautologies. Then T1 and T2 have the same minimal
models.
The deletion of tautologies is an equivalence transformation, so it does not change the set
of models, and thus also not the set of minimal models. Now suppose that we apply GPPE
to a rule A← B ∧R, where B is an objective atom, and suppose that B ∨ Ai ← Ri ,
i = 1, . . . , n, are all the rules about B , i.e., rules containing B in their heads.
• Since the new rules A∨Ai←R∧Ri , resulting from the application of GPPE, are
logical consequences of the rules in T1, every model of T1 is also a model of T2.
• Let I be a minimal model of T2. We first show that it is a model of T1 (not necessarily
minimal). Suppose this is not the case, so the rule A← B ∧R is violated in I (this
is the only rule in T1 \ T2). This means that I |= B , I |= R, and I 6|= A. Since I
is a minimal model of T2, the interpretation I ′ with I ′ 6|= B (and otherwise equal
to I) cannot be a model of T2. Since objective atoms do not occur negated in rule
bodies, this means that there is a rule with B in the head, i.e., one of the rules
B ∨Ai←Ri , 3 such that I ′ |=Ri and I ′ 6|=Ai . Since I ′ |=Ri , the atom B cannot
be contained in Ri , and since we exclude multiple occurrences in the head, it is also
not contained in Ai . Thus, I |=Ri and I 6|=Ai . But now we infer that the new rule
A∨Ai←R∧Ri contained in T2 is violated by I , which is a contradiction.
We now have to show that the sets of minimal models are equal:
• Suppose that I is a minimal model of T1. By the first part of this proof, we know that
it is a model of T2. If it were not minimal, there would have to be a smaller minimal
model I ′ of T2. But by the second part of this proof it would also have to be a model
of T1, contradicting the assumed minimality of I as a model of T1.
• Suppose that I is a minimal model of T2. Then it is a model of T1. If there were a
smaller model I ′ of T1, it would also have to be a model of T2, again leading to a
contradiction.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3.6
First we prove the following lemma which characterizes minimal models of special
belief theories.
Lemma A.2. Let T be any belief theory and TB be a set of formulae which contain only
belief atoms. Minimal models of T ∪ TB are precisely those minimal models of T which
satisfy TB .
Proof.
• Let I be a minimal model of T ∪ TB . Of course, I is a model of T and of TB . Now
suppose that there is a smaller model I ′ of T . Since I and I ′ do not differ in the
3 It is not a new rule A ∨ Ai ← R ∧ Ri , because otherwise A would contain B, and the unfolded rule
A← B ∧R would be a tautology and could never be violated.
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interpretation of belief atoms, I ′ is also a model of TB , and thus a model of T ∪ TB .
But this contradicts the assumed minimality of I .
• Let I be a minimal model of T which also satisfies TB . Clearly, I is a model
of T ∪ TB . Since I ′ is also a model of T , the existence of a smaller model I ′ would
contradict the minimality of I . 2
Now we continue the proof of of Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 3.6. Let T be an arbitrary finite belief theory and let
T̂ = CnAEB
(
T ∪Bcomp(Tres)
)
.
If a formula F is true in all minimal models of T̂ then BF is already contained in T̂ . In
other words, ΨT (T̂ )⊆ T̂ .
Let TB be the subset of T̂ which consists entirely of belief atoms, i.e., B(comp(Tres))
together with the axiom CA, all instances of the axiom DA and all formulae forced in by
the derivation rule IR. Then the models of T̂ coincide with the models of T ∪ TB because
the required closure under logical consequences does not change the set of models.
By Lemma A.2, minimal models of T ∪ TB are precisely those minimal models of T
which satisfy TB . Suppose that F holds in all minimal models of T̂ . By Proposition 3.3,
the minimal models of T coincide with the models of comp(Tres) and therefore F holds in
all models of comp(Tres) ∪ TB, i.e., it is a propositional consequence of comp(Tres) ∪ TB .
By the compactness of propositional logic, there is a finite subset
{F1, . . . ,Fn} ⊆ comp(Tres) ∪ TB
such that {F1, . . . ,Fn} |= F . But then F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn→ F is a tautology and therefore, by
Proposition 2.3, B(F1)∧ · · · ∧ B(Fn)→ B(F ) is contained in T̂ .
If Fi is from comp(Tres), then B(Fi) is obviously contained in T̂ and otherwise we
get B(Fi) by necessitation (see Proposition 2.3). Thus, by the closure under classical
consequences, we conclude B(F ) ∈ T̂ .
A.4. Proof of the equivalence of the axioms used in the definition of AEB to the original
axioms
We show now that the axioms used in Definition 2.1 are completely equivalent to the
following ones used in the original definition of autoepistemic belief theories given in
[23]:
(D) Consistency Axiom. ¬Bfalse.
(K) Normality Axiom. B(F →G)→ (BF → BG).
(N) Necessitation Inference Rule. FBF .
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We recall that, in the presence of the axiom K, the axiom D is equivalent to the axiom
BF →¬BF , stating that if we believe in a formula F then we do not believe in F (see [23]
for details).
Proposition A.3. The axioms D and K and the necessitation rule N are equivalent to the
axioms CA and DA and the inference rule IR.
More precisely, a theory in the language LAEB contains all (substitution instances of)
the axioms D and K and is closed under both standard propositional consequence and the
necessitation rule N if and only if it contains all (substitution instances of) the axioms CA
and DA and is closed under both standard propositional consequence and the inference
rule IR.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that a theory T contains all (substitution instances of) the axioms D
and K and is closed under both standard propositional consequence and the Necessitation
Rule N. Since true belongs to T , from the Necessitation Rule N it follows that so does
Btrue and thus the axiom CA holds.
To show that the axiom DA holds we first show that for any formulae F and
G :B(F ∧G) → BF ∧ BG belongs to T . Clearly (F ∧G)→ F ∈ T and therefore,
by the Necessitation Rule N, B((F ∧G)→ F) ∈ T . From the Normality Axiom K
we infer that B(F ∧G)→ BF ∈ T . Similarly, B(F ∧G)→ BG ∈ T . It follows that
B(F ∧G)→ BF ∧BG ∈ T .
To show that the axiom DA holds it now suffices to prove that for any formulae F and
G :BF ∧BG→ B(F ∧G)
belongs to T . Clearly, F → (G→ F ∧G) ∈ T and therefore, by the Necessitation Rule N,
B(F → (G→ F ∧G)) ∈ T .
From the Normality Axiom K we infer that BF → B(G→ F ∧G) ∈ T . Applying the
Normality Axiom K again we conclude that BF → (BG→ B(F ∧G)) ∈ T . This shows
that
BF ∧BG→ B(F ∧G) ∈ T .
To demonstrate that the inference rule IR holds suppose that F ↔ G belongs to T .
By necessitation, also B(F ↔ G) belongs to T . From the Normality Axiom it follows
immediately that so does BF ↔ BG.
(⇐) Suppose that a theory T contains all (substitution instances of) the axioms CA and
DA and is closed under both standard propositional consequence and the inference rule IR.
Clearly, the axiom D also holds. Since (F → G) ∧ F ↔ F ∧G belongs to T , from the
rule IR it follows that B((F →G)∧ F)↔ B(F ∧G) belongs to T . From the axiom DA
we conclude that also B(F → G) ∧ B(F )↔ BF ∧ BG belongs to T . This proves that
B((F →G))∧B(F )→ B(G) belongs to T and thus the Normality Axiom K holds.
It remains to show that T is closed under necessitation. If F belongs to T then so does
F ↔ true. By the rule IR, the formula BF ↔ Btrue belongs to T which implies that BF
also belongs to T . 2
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